S T R A T E G I C H O R I Z O N
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS · SA-2026-03

An Incident of Navigation

Sub-threshold activity in the High North, and the forums that cannot judge it

The northern states are describing a pattern of sub-threshold activity for which no single route runs all the way from detection to accountability. Cables are cut and the investigations stay open. Satellite navigation is jammed almost every day over east Finnmark, from a direction the authorities have traced, and the procedure that exists for raising it obliges nobody to answer. Drones close airports, and a year later a government revises its own account of what happened. The phrase that gives this analysis its title is the one a Finnish court used to dismiss the strongest case any northern state has brought: the cutting of a power cable and four data cables was, in law, an incident of navigation. An appellate court has since disagreed, and that disagreement is the only movement in the record.

KEY FINDINGS

	Position at the data cut-off
The record	Nine publicly recorded damage events to Baltic subsea cable and pipeline since September 2022. One was closed after prosecutors could not establish intentional conduct, two were closed for want of jurisdiction, five remain open, and one is before a court. No conviction
The strongest case	The Eagle S cut Estlink 2 and four data cables on 25 December 2024. Finland boarded the ship, detained the crew and charged three officers. On 3 October 2025 the Helsinki District Court dismissed the charges for want of jurisdiction
What moved it	On 27 August 2026 the Helsinki Court of Appeal quashed that dismissal and remitted the case, deciding jurisdiction only, on the ground that the consequences landed in Finland. What removed the Article 97 bar was behavioural: losing the anchor was a fortuity; continuing to drag it for more than three hours after the authorities made contact, on the facts as alleged, was not. The court made no finding of intent and none of guilt
The other instrument	Interference with satellite navigation over Finnmark ran on 18 days in 2021, 122 in 2022 and 294 in 2023, and is now near-daily. It has been traced east since 2018. The response is two further monitoring stations in 2026
The inversion	The activity that is best attributed carries the lightest response; the activity that is worst attributed carries an alliance maritime mission. The response tracks what is visible and damageable, not what is attributable

	Position at the data cut-off
What the mission did	Baltic Sentry cut the response time to a suspicious contact from about seventeen hours to one, and produced twelve boardings in a year. It did not produce a conviction, because that is not what a presence does
The frame	A United States–Denmark–Greenland defence agreement was signed on 22 September 2026. It has no end date, and its Article XI commits Denmark and Greenland to ensure that an independent Greenland would remain in NATO, applying for membership if necessary, and would assume the Kingdom's obligations under it — if and when it enters into force, which awaits the completion of parliamentary procedures in Denmark and Greenland and a diplomatic note to that effect. Three weeks later the Arctic Circle Assembly met with no Danish minister and no serving United States official present

Table 1. The record in summary. Every line is established in the sections below, with its evidence and its limits.

Series	Strategic Analysis SA-2026-03. Standalone. It takes up the proposition that SA-2026-02 set aside
Subject	Sub-threshold activity against the northern states, the evidence standing behind each instrument of it, and the forums available to answer it
Relevance	Strategic Analysis SA-2026-02 on the Northern Sea Route; Canonical Data Sheet CDS-2026-EU v1.1
Author	Strategic Horizon
Version	v1.5 FINAL. Approved by the Founder, 12 October 2026
Data cut-off	11 October 2026

SECTION I

The proposition, and where it came from

The Arctic Circle Assembly met at Harpa in Reykjavík from 8 to 10 October 2026, and carried out of it two propositions. The first — that Asian energy imperatives are redrawing Arctic shipping — was tested in Strategic Analysis SA-2026-02 and does not reappear here. The second is the subject of this analysis: that the northern states face a rising tempo of sub-threshold activity, from subsea cable disruption to satellite navigation jamming in Finnmark and ambiguous approaches around Svalbard and Iceland, to be met by resilience across the whole of society rather than by escalation.

That proposition has a strength the first one lacked. It is not a forecast about commerce; it describes events that have already happened and are recorded. The weakness is of a different kind, and it is the weakness this analysis works on: the events are recorded, and almost none of them is attributed. A campaign is a set of acts with an author. What the record holds is a set of acts.

The institutional setting matters for why Reykjavík placed this where it did. On 22 September 2026, three weeks before the Assembly opened, the United States, Denmark and Greenland signed a defence agreement in New York. Its preamble reaffirms the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and recognises Greenlandic self-determination; no article transfers territory. It provides for new defence areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig subject to mutual agreement, a permanent consultative committee with a ninety-day escalation ladder, and amendment only by mutual consent. Article XI gives it no end date and commits Denmark and Greenland together to ensure that an independent Greenland would agree to remain in NATO, applying for membership if necessary, and would affirmatively assume the rights and obligations under it. The obligation falls on the present parties; a treaty cannot impose duties on a state that does not yet exist. None of it is yet in force: Article XII makes entry into force depend on a diplomatic note to the United States confirming that the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed by the Kingdom of Denmark together with Greenland — a condition that attaches to one side only — and those procedures had not been reported as begun at the data cut-off. The Assembly then opened with a Greenlandic plenary under the title Nothing about Greenland without Greenland, and the printed programme recorded two absences: no serving State Department or White House official, and no Danish minister.

SH ASSESSMENT I/1

The gathering that framed the question was missing the two governments whose agreement had just answered part of it.

This is not an accusation of bad faith, and absences from a conference are a thin evidential base. It is recorded because the Assembly is where the sub-threshold proposition acquired its circulation, and because the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance in the Arctic was one of its stated themes. A forum discussing alliance cohesion three weeks after an agreement of indefinite duration was signed over the same territory, with neither signatory government represented at ministerial level, is describing a subject rather than conducting it.

The working rule is the one SA-2026-02 adopted and this analysis keeps. The Assembly is where these propositions are stated; it is not where they are evidenced. Every factual claim below is traced to its own source, and the Assembly is not used as one.

SECTION II

Three instruments, three evidence bases

Sub-threshold activity in the High North is reported as one phenomenon. It is three, and they do not share an evidential footing. Treating them as a single campaign conceals the fact that what is known about each is different in kind.

CABLES	JAMMING	DRONES
Anchor damage to subsea cable and pipeline	*Satellite navigation interference*	*Unidentified aircraft over airports and installations*
Episodic. Thirteen incidents since 2022	Continuous. Near-daily over east Finnmark	Episodic. Nordic airports, September 2025
Attribution contested in every case	Source traced to the Kola Peninsula since 2018	No operator identified in any incident
Forum: criminal courts, where jurisdiction allows	Forum: none identified	Forum: none reached
Response: a NATO maritime mission	Response: two further monitoring stations	Response: airspace closure and counter-drone purchase
Convictions to date: none	**Proceedings to date: none**	**Identifications to date: none**

Figure 1. The three instruments and what stands behind each. Sources as cited in Sections III to V.

The difference is not of degree. For satellite navigation interference, the activity is continuous, measured by a civil regulator, and its direction established for eight years; what is missing is any forum in which to raise it. For cable damage, the activity is episodic and the forum exists — a criminal court — but the authorship of each event is contested and, until recently, the jurisdiction to try it was denied. For the drone incursions, neither the actor nor the forum is available at all.

SH ASSESSMENT II/1

The three instruments are joined in description and separate in evidence, and the join flatters the weakest of them.

An account that presents cables, jamming and drones as one campaign borrows the attribution confidence of the jamming for the cable events, where it does not exist, and borrows the physical damage of the cable events for the jamming, which causes none. Each half of the exchange is unearned.

That is worth stating plainly because the composite is what reaches decision-makers. The composite is more alarming than any of its parts and less actionable than any of them, because no single response addresses a category assembled this way.

SECTION III

The cable record

Nine damage events to subsea cable and pipeline in the Baltic are publicly recorded since September 2022. The record of what became of them is the part that is rarely set out.




Figure 2. The events and their dispositions. Sources: compiled from the public record of the incidents and from the Atlantic Council issue brief on how Baltic Sea nations have handled the cable cuts.

One event has a finding. In January 2025 a Maltese-flagged bulker struck a Sweden–Latvia data cable; the vessel was seized, the prosecutor could not prove that the crew had released the

anchor intentionally, and the investigation was shelved. That is the only explicit finding of accident on the record, and it was reached because intent could not be shown, not because innocence was established.

Two events were closed for want of jurisdiction rather than for want of suspicion. Denmark and Sweden ended their Nord Stream investigations on the ground that they lacked jurisdiction over conduct beyond the territorial sea involving foreign vessels and foreign nationals. In the Balticconnector case the vessel identified by investigators sailed beyond their reach, and in the Yi Peng 3 case the flag state limited access to a supervised and truncated boarding.

SH ASSESSMENT III/1

The record does not show a failure to investigate. It shows investigations that run out of law before they run out of evidence.

In every closed case the obstacle was reach rather than proof: a flag state that would not cooperate, a vessel that left, a jurisdiction that did not extend. The one case that turned on evidence turned on intent, which is the element a dragged anchor is best placed to make unprovable.

This has a consequence for how the pattern should be described. An unexplained event is not the same as an unattributable one, and a case closed for jurisdiction is not evidence of innocence or of guilt. A reader counting nine events and no convictions should not conclude that nothing happened, and should equally not conclude that nine attacks occurred. The honest statement is that the record cannot presently bear either reading.

SECTION IV

An incident of navigation

On Christmas Day 2024 the Eagle S, a Cook Islands-flagged oil tanker, dragged its anchor across the Estlink 2 power interconnector between Finland and Estonia and then across four data cables in the Finnish exclusive economic zone. Finland boarded the vessel, detained it and charged the master and two senior officers with aggravated criminal damage and aggravated interference with communications. This is the furthest any northern state has taken a cable case.

On 3 October 2025 the Helsinki District Court dismissed the charges and ordered the state to bear the costs. The court did not find that the damage had not occurred; it had already held that the economic loss in Finland met the statutory threshold for both offences. It held that the events were an incident of navigation within the meaning of Article 97(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that penal proceedings over such an incident belong exclusively to the flag state and the state of the crew’s nationality; it read Article 113 the same way, as leaving enforcement with the flag state. Neither state was Finland.

Article 97(1)	Penal proceedings arising from an incident of navigation on the high seas lie with the flag state or the state of the accused’s nationality. The provision was drafted for collisions, and reaches the exclusive economic zone through Article 58(2)
Article 113	Flag states must criminalise damage to cables and pipelines beyond the territorial sea by their ships and nationals. Whether that leaves enforcement with the flag state alone is contested: the Helsinki District Court read it so; the Court of Appeal held it a duty to criminalise and not a limit on jurisdiction

Article 79(1) and 58(1)	All states keep the freedom to lay and maintain cables. The coastal state's regulatory competence over them is narrow, and narrower than its competence over installations under Articles 60 and 80
Article 101(a)(ii)	Deliberate attacks on undersea infrastructure might be reached as piracy, but only where committed for private ends, which excludes acts attributable to a state — and only against property outside the jurisdiction of any state, which a cable in an exclusive economic zone is not

Table 2. The prosecution gap, as the provisions create it. Source: the operative text of the Convention and the analysis of the gap published on EJIL:Talk!

On 27 August 2026 the Helsinki Court of Appeal quashed the dismissal and remitted the case. It decided jurisdiction only and expressed no view on guilt. It took jurisdiction on territorial grounds: the alleged consequences landed in Finland, the damage and its effects on power and telecommunications having occurred there. It held that Article 113 imposes a duty to criminalise and not a limit on jurisdiction, so the reading on which the first court had relied fell away. It resolved the resulting conflict with the Cook Islands under Article 59 of the Convention, holding it equitable that the case be tried in Finland and giving particular weight to the gravity of the consequences there — an article written for residual rights conflicts in the exclusive economic zone, applied here to a conflict of criminal jurisdiction, which is novel. What removed the bar the first court had erected was narrower than any of that. The court accepted that the sudden loss of the anchor was a fortuity, and held that, on the facts as alleged, the event ceased to be a fortuity once the crew continued to drag the anchor for more than three hours after the authorities had made contact.

A second account records the same holding: that the events were not a maritime accident under the Convention, and that the alleged offences were committed in Finland. The case is not finished. It returns to the Helsinki District Court to be heard on the merits; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Finland may be sought until 26 October 2026, two weeks after this analysis's data cut-off; and the district court's earlier readings of the danger and communications elements are open for review on remand. No one has been convicted of anything.

Two kinds of movement have to be kept apart here, because the record contains both. Baltic Sentry moved the operational response, and moved it a long way: seventeen hours to one. A monitoring programme moves the quality of observation. Neither moves accountability, because neither is a forum, and the question of whether anyone is answerable is not reached by arriving faster or seeing better.

SH ASSESSMENT IV/1 — THE FINDING THIS ANALYSIS TURNS ON

The only instrument in this record that has materially moved the accountability gap is a court reading a treaty, and the element without which it could not have moved is what a crew did after being spoken to.

The Helsinki Court of Appeal is the first body to narrow the gap, and it did so on a fact that separates an event a coastal state may try from one it may not, without requiring proof of who ordered anything. It decided that Finland may hear the case, and it did so on territorial grounds: the consequences landed in Finland. It did not decide that an attack occurred, and nothing below should be read as saying it did.

The fact that did the work is worth naming precisely, and so is the work it did. Territoriality supplied the jurisdiction; the fortuity point removed the obstacle on which the first court had dismissed the case. Without it the territorial argument could not have been reached. And the fact is not the flag, not the ownership, not the cargo, not the pattern of movement and not the political context: it is three hours of continued dragging after contact, as alleged. Intent at the moment the anchor was lost is exactly what a deniable operation is constructed to obscure. Conduct after the coastal state is on the line is not, and it is observable by the coastal state itself.

The limits of the finding should be stated with it. One appellate ruling, not final, on jurisdiction alone, in one state, binds nobody else and convicts nobody, and it rests on facts that remain to be proved. It is the direction that is the finding, not the outcome: the gap is being narrowed by litigation in a national court, which is slow, contingent and reversible, and not by any alliance instrument, which is fast and cannot narrow it at all.

SECTION V

The instrument nobody prosecutes

Interference with satellite navigation over northern Norway is the best-evidenced activity in this analysis and the one against which least has been built. The Norwegian Communications Authority recorded disturbance over Finnmark airspace on 18 days in 2021, 122 days in 2022 and 294 days in 2023. It is now described as an almost daily occurrence, principally affecting approaches to Kirkenes, Vadsø and Vardø.




Figure 3. Frequency and depth. Sources: Norwegian Communications Authority day counts via the Barents Observer; altitude measurements by the authority and the Finnmark Police District, reported March and May 2026.

The trend that matters is not the frequency but the altitude. Last winter signal loss was measured down to about 4,000 feet; this winter down to 1,800 to 2,000 feet; over the Varanger Peninsula strong jamming has been recorded at about 500 metres. Lower means deeper inside the phase of flight where an aircraft is committed. In September 2025 a Widerøe Dash-8 abandoned a landing at Vardø after its signals were disrupted, and a SAS pilot reported spoofing on approach to Kirkenes earlier that year.

Attribution here is of a different order from the cable cases. Norwegian and Finnish authorities traced the source to the Kola Peninsula in 2018, and interference was first observed at Kirkenes in 2017. Norwegian officials now say publicly that the disturbance comes from the east, from Russia, while declining to name exact locations and acknowledging uncertainty about the precise geographical origin. The Norwegian minister has called the jamming and spoofing a violation of international law. The authority sent a formal information request to the Russian radio communications regulator and has received no reply.

There is a procedure for exactly this, and it is worth stating precisely what it provides. Article 15 of the Radio Regulations governs harmful interference: an affected administration informs the administration of the interfering station, which “may take such steps as may be necessary” to eliminate it. Acknowledging the report does not constitute an acceptance of responsibility. If the interference persists the affected administration may send a report of irregularity or infraction, and may forward the case to the Radiocommunication Bureau for its information. Where a safety service is affected — and aeronautical radionavigation is one, where the affected signal is in a band allocated to it — the duties are stronger: administrations undertake to act immediately, and an administration informed that its station is interfering with a safety service shall promptly investigate, take any necessary remedial action and respond in a timely manner. No procedure under the Radio Regulations is compulsory and none carries a penalty.



Two theatres, one description. The interference is continuous and its direction is established; the cable events are episodic and their authorship is not. Both are reported as a single sub-threshold campaign against the northern states.
Zones are schematic and indicate where activity has been reported, not mapped extents. Coastlines from Natural Earth.

Figure 4. The two theatres. Coastlines from Natural Earth; zones indicate where activity has been reported and are schematic.

Two things stand behind that article and neither closes the gap. The Constitution of the Union requires in terms that stations be operated so as not to cause harmful interference, and then provides that military radio installations need observe that requirement only as far as possible — which is to say that the protection is weakest precisely where a state installation is the source. A compulsory route does exist elsewhere: Article 84 of the Chicago Convention makes the procedure of the ICAO Council binding on contracting states in disputes over the interpretation or application of that Convention, with appeal to the International Court of Justice, and both Norway and the Russian Federation are parties. Whether interference originating in one state’s territory and degrading navigation in another engages that Convention is itself contestable, and this analysis takes no position on it. The accurate statement is therefore narrower than the one made in the previous draft: a compulsory forum exists in principle, its availability turns on a

contested question of substance, and the instrument written for interference itself carries no compulsion at all.

What has been built against it is a measurement programme. Three dedicated monitoring stations stand in the border region; two more are planned during 2026, extending coverage across the Varanger Peninsula and the Barents Sea, supported by mobile detectors on official vehicles, on Hurtigruten ships and on coast guard vessels. The stated purpose is situational awareness.

> **SH ASSESSMENT V/1**
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> **A minister has called it a violation of international law, and the instrument written for that violation exempts the likely source from it.**
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> The asymmetry with the cable cases is complete and runs the other way on every axis. Here the activity is continuous rather than episodic; the direction is established rather than contested; the characterisation has been made at ministerial level rather than left to investigators; and the response is to install two further sensors. There the authorship is unknown and the response is an alliance maritime mission.
>
> The explanation is not negligence, and this analysis does not allege any. Jamming damages no property, sinks no vessel and leaves no object to seize, so it engages neither the criminal law that reaches the anchor nor the thresholds that trigger collective response. The mechanism Norway used is a report under Article 15, which carries a duty to investigate and respond where a safety service is affected, and no means whatever of enforcing it. The request went unanswered, which under the Regulations is simply what happens next. Behind it stands a rule that military installations need avoid harmful interference only as far as possible, and a compulsory procedure under a different convention whose application to this activity is contested. But it means the northern states have arrived at a position in which the thing they can prove is the thing they can do least about.

The third instrument

The drones have been left to last because the record will not carry more. Between 22 and 28 September 2025 unidentified aircraft closed Copenhagen airport for most of an evening, closed Aalborg twice, closed Billund for about an hour, and were reported near Esbjerg and Sønderborg, over Karup air base for several hours, over Skrydstrup, and over the Borris camp where Ukrainian personnel were training. Oslo Gardermoen closed the same week, and drones were reported over Ørland and Brønnøysund. The Copenhagen police chief judged from the number, size, flight patterns and timing that a capable actor was responsible and that the control point could be kilometres away, possibly a ship. The Danish prime minister called it the most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date.

In June 2026 the Danish government and military confirmed that the drones had flown and that their origin was unknown. On 1 October 2026, a week before the Assembly opened, the military issued a revised report admitting that its account of one incident might have been mistaken: its soldiers may have fired into the air while a civilian aircraft passed, as aviation and drone specialists had suggested, and the review followed witness accounts reported in the media that contradicted the original version. The military maintains that the soldiers fired at what they believed to be a drone. The revision concerns that one incident. Nothing in it disturbs the June confirmation that drones flew over the country, and nothing in it bears on the airport closures at Copenhagen, Aalborg, Billund or Oslo, which are not in dispute.

SH ASSESSMENT V/2

With the third instrument the uncertainty has reached the event itself, not merely its author.

For the cables, what happened is established and who did it is not. For the interference, both what happens and where it comes from are established, and no consequence follows. For the drones, a year after the week in question, a government has revised its own account of one of the incidents — one, not the series, and the flights themselves are not in doubt. That is a different order of problem, and it is the right one to end the comparison on: the instrument that attracted the phrase most serious attack on Danish critical infrastructure to date is the instrument whose record is least settled.

The revision should be read as creditable rather than as embarrassing. A defence ministry that commissions a review because witnesses contradict its own account, and then publishes the correction, is doing what the other two instruments have had no occasion to do. It also shows what sub-threshold activity costs a state that has not been attacked in any way it can name: the burden of establishing, against itself, what took place.

SECTION VI

What the response actually tracks

NATO launched Baltic Sentry in January 2025 after the Estlink 2 cut, committing allied warships, aircraft and naval drones to the surveillance of critical seabed sectors. A year on, allied forces reported that the time to respond to a suspicious contact had fallen from about seventeen hours to one, that twelve boardings had been conducted under national authorities, and that malicious interference with undersea infrastructure had significantly reduced over the period.

Those are real results and the first of them is the one worth holding. A seventeen-hour response meant that a vessel dragging an anchor finished before anyone arrived. A one-hour response means it does not, and the Eagle S appeal shows exactly why that matters: the alleged three hours of continued dragging after contact is what removed the bar on which the first court had dismissed the case. Presence did not produce the legal finding, and did not supply the jurisdiction, which was territorial. It produced the fact without which neither could have been reached.




Figure 5. Attribution against response. Positions are this analysis's ordering of the record and are not measurements.

SH ASSESSMENT VI/1

The response map is drawn by what can be seen and seized, not by what can be attributed or by what does most harm.

A cable event damages property, happens at a point, and leaves a ship that can be boarded. It therefore attracts ships. Navigation interference damages a service, happens continuously across a region, and leaves nothing to board. It therefore attracts sensors. The allocation follows the physics of the instrument rather than the strength of the case or the size of the consequence, and nobody chose it.

Put at its shortest: the instruments available to respond are strongest where the evidence is weakest, and weakest where the evidence is strongest. The practical effect is a gap that an adversary need not be clever to find. An instrument that produces no seizable object produces no response beyond observation, and the record now establishes that such an instrument can be operated against a NATO member almost daily for several years with no publicly observable cost imposed on the originating actor.

One qualification cuts against the force of that. Presence is not useless merely because it does not convict: it compresses the window in which an operation can be completed, and Section IV shows that compression generating the very fact a court later relied on. The criticism is of the distribution, not of the instrument.

SECTION VII

The case against this reading

Three objections are strong enough to be set out at their own strength rather than answered in passing.

The first is that courts are the wrong measure. Deterrence does not require conviction; it requires that the cost of an operation exceed its value, and a one-hour response, a boarding, a detained crew and an impounded vessel impose cost whatever a court later decides. On this view the absence of convictions is close to irrelevant, and the significant reduction reported over 2025 is the result that counts.

The second is that the jamming is spillover rather than targeting. Russian electronic warfare systems near Olenya, in northern Karelia and on the Kola Peninsula are widely assessed to be aimed at Ukrainian drones. Interference that reaches Finnmark may be a by-product of air defence rather than an operation against Norway, in which case there is nothing to prosecute because no act was directed at anyone, and a monitoring programme is the proportionate answer to a hazard rather than an attack.

The third is that the Eagle S ruling proves less than Section IV claims. It is one appellate decision in one state, on jurisdiction alone, not final, open to further appeal, and remitted to a court that has already dismissed the case once. Building a finding on it risks treating a procedural step as a turning point.

SH ASSESSMENT VII/1

The second objection is the strongest and this analysis cannot defeat it on the record. The first and third can be met.

On the first: cost imposed without attribution is cost imposed on a vessel, not on a principal. Twelve boardings against a fleet that is large, cheap and replaceable is an operating expense, and the reduction reported over the year is real but is not disaggregated, is reported by the party conducting the mission, and covers a period in which several other things also changed.

On the third, the objection is correct about the ruling and wrong about the claim. This analysis does not say the gap has closed. It says the only movement toward closing it came from a court, which remains true whether or not the Supreme Court of Finland takes the case, and would remain true if the remand ended in acquittal.

On the second objection, the honest answer is that no public evidence settles it. The day counts, the altitudes and the traced direction establish that the interference occurs and where it comes from; none of them establishes purpose, and this analysis has located nothing that does. The distinction matters less than it appears for the finding in Section VI, because a hazard emanating continuously from one state into the airspace of another is a thing the second state can do little about either way. It matters a great deal for any proposal to characterise the activity as an attack, and nothing here supports that characterisation.

SECTION VIII

Recommendation

RECOMMENDATION SA-03-R

Record conduct after contact, and publish the disposition of every case. Two measures, addressed to the northern coastal states and to the alliance mission operating in their waters.

First, treat the interval after contact as evidence and collect it as such. The Helsinki Court of Appeal found jurisdiction on a fact that only the coastal state can observe and that only the coastal state can record: what a vessel did in the hours after it was hailed. A mission whose principal achievement is a one-hour response is already in position to produce that record systematically — time of first contact, instructions given, response, and the vessel’s conduct thereafter, logged to an evidential standard rather than an operational one. This costs nothing that is not already being done and converts a patrol report into something a prosecutor can use.

Second, publish the disposition of every cable and pipeline damage event, not merely its occurrence. The occurrence of these events is reported immediately and widely; what became of them is not, which is why a record containing one finding of accident and two jurisdictional closures is commonly read as nine attacks. A standing public register of events, investigating authority, status, and outcome where reached would cost one table and would discipline the description of the pattern in both directions — against those who count every event as an attack, and against those who treat an unresolved case as a closed one.

Neither measure requires anyone to accept the reading in Section VI, and neither touches the jamming problem, for which this analysis has no recommendation to offer. That is itself the finding of Section V, and it is left standing rather than dressed in an action.

Limits

The count of nine cable and pipeline events is of publicly recorded damage events in the Baltic since September 2022 as compiled from the public record and from the Atlantic Council issue brief; it is not an official register, no such register was located, and events that were not reported would not appear in it. Dispositions are as reported at the data cut-off and several are described as ongoing, which may mean active investigation or may mean inactivity. The account of the Eagle S proceedings is taken from legal commentary on the two judgments and from contemporaneous reporting, not from the judgments themselves, which legal review was also unable to reach; the case numbers are R 706/2025/12270 in the district court and R 16/2025/2572 in the court of appeal, and a reader relying on the precise holding should go to those texts. The reading of Articles 97(1), 113 and 59 has been checked by legal review against that commentary and not against the judgments. The appellate reasoning is expressly conditional on the facts as pleaded, and the statements of continued dragging here carry that qualification wherever they appear. The leave-to-appeal deadline of 26 October 2026 is derived from the sixty-day period in Finnish procedure and is not confirmed in any source located; whether leave has been sought is not known. Applying Article 59 to a conflict of criminal jurisdiction has no settled precedent, which is noted in the text. The jamming day counts are the Norwegian Communications Authority's as reported by the Barents Observer and cover Finnmark airspace only; no comparable series was located for 2024, 2025 or 2026, and the characterisation of the present position as near-daily is the authority's own description rather than a count. The altitude figures come from three separate measurements reported at different times and are not a series. The attribution of the interference to a source on the Russian side is as stated by Norwegian authorities; purpose is not established anywhere in the material located, and this analysis makes no claim about it. The Article 15 provisions are quoted from the Radio Regulations as published by the International Telecommunication Union, and the wording has not been checked against the current edition. Whether a given signal falls in a band allocated to aeronautical radionavigation depends on the band, and this analysis does not establish which bands were affected in any particular incident. The treatment of compulsory process covers the Radio Regulations, the Constitution of the Union and Article 84 of the Chicago Convention; arbitration under the Constitution is compulsory only between parties to the Optional Protocol, whose parties were not checked, and no bilateral frequency-coordination arrangement between Norway and the Russian Federation was examined. The absence of any further compulsory route is therefore not asserted. The account of the drone incidents is from contemporaneous reporting and from the Danish military's revised report of 1 October 2026; closure durations and flight counts are incomplete in the sources located, and the revision concerns one incident and not the series. The Baltic Sentry figures are reported by NATO and allied forces, which conducted the mission; the reduction in interference is stated without numbers and is not independently verified here. The account of the defence agreement of 22 September 2026 was checked by legal review against the published text; the statement that parliamentary procedures had not begun rests on reporting rather than on a dated official source. The two absences from the Arctic Circle Assembly are from the printed programme as surveyed before the Assembly opened, not from attendance records. No view is offered on the merits of any pending proceeding, on the lawfulness of any state's conduct, or on the Greenland question.

Principal sources: EJIL:Talk!, on the prosecution gap for attacks on subsea cables and pipelines, and on the Helsinki District Court's Eagle S judgment; Lkos Law, on the Helsinki Court of Appeal decision of 27 August 2026, the case numbers and Article 97 UNCLOS; the Radio Regulations and the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, on harmful interference and on military installations; the Chicago Convention, Article 84; the published text of the agreement of 22 September 2026 as reproduced by the American Presidency Project and the Danish Prime Minister's Office; Euronews and contemporaneous reporting, on the Danish drone incidents and the revised military report of 1 October 2026; Atlantic Council, on how the Baltic Sea nations have handled suspicious cable cuts; the Barents Observer and Arctic Today, on satellite navigation interference over Finnmark, its day counts, altitudes and the Norwegian monitoring programme; NATO and allied forces via United24, on Baltic Sentry response times and boardings; Al Jazeera, on the drone incursions at Copenhagen and Oslo of 22 September 2025; Meridian Report, on the United States–Denmark–Greenland defence agreement of 22 September 2026; Arctic Portal and Arctic Today, on the 2026 Arctic Circle Assembly and its programme; Natural Earth, for coastlines. © Strategic Horizon 2026. Strategic Analysis SA-2026-03, v1.5 FINAL. Open access. Reviewed by the Red Team Critic, Red Line & Audit, the Chief Strategy Officer and Legal Review; approved by the Founder.